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Modernizing Jury instructions  
in the Age of sociAl MediA
By David E. Aaronson and Sydney M. Patterson
Following a jury trial in Vermont, the defendant, a Somali Bantu immigrant, was convicted of aggra-vated sexual assault on a child. A juror obtained 
information on the Internet about Somali culture and reli-
gion, a subject that played a significant role at trial, which 
the juror discussed for 10–15 minutes during deliberations 
to support his own position. The Vermont Supreme Court 
reversed, finding prejudicial error because this informa-
tion had the capacity to affect the jury’s verdict, as jurors 
could have relied on it to interpret the testimony of the 
Somali witnesses and determine the credibility of these 
witnesses. (State v. Abdi, 45 A.3d 29 (Vt. 2012).)
In the political corruption trial of  former Baltimore 
Mayor Sheila Dixon, five jurors used social media to have 
direct, case-related communications with one another 
while the trial was still proceeding. The case, which resulted 
in the conviction of Dixon, was challenged after the verdict 
when Dixon’s attorneys discovered that the five jurors had 
become Facebook friends during the course of the trial 
and had posted discussions about the trial on their pages. 
Dixon’s attorneys alleged that the five “Facebook Friends” 
may have bullied other jurors into the guilty verdict, con-
tending that they were “a caucus separate and apart” from 
their colleagues. Before presiding Circuit Court Judge Den-
nis Sweeney questioned the jurors about their conduct, 
which was in direct violation of his specific instruction to 
avoid discussing the case on social media sites, the pros-
ecutors and Dixon reached a plea deal that ended Dixon’s 
appeals. (See Dennis Sweeney, Social Media and Jurors, 
43 Md. B.J. 44, 46 (2010).)
However, Judge Sweeney did question one juror who 
had posted “F--- the Judge” on his Facebook page after 
Judge Sweeney had called a hearing on the matter. Judge 
Sweeney reportedly asked the juror about his offensive 
comment and was told, “Hey Judge, that’s just Facebook 
stuff.” (See Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Tri-
als Go Off Track, ReuteRs LegaL (Dec. 8, 2010), http://
tinyurl.com/9nt4umx.)
These cases illustrate the two broad categories of 
improper juror social media use: (1) use of the Internet 
to conduct research, investigating facts or the law; and 
(2) use of social media to contact others or post/publish 
information. (See Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury 
Trial Survive Google?, 25 CRiM. Just. 4, 5 (Winter 2011).)
The use of social media is now an integral part of the 
communication lexicon. It is commonplace to commu-
nicate and do research electronically through the use of 
e-mail, text messaging, or Twitter, through blogs and 
websites, such as Wikipedia, and search engines, such as 
Google, or other social networking websites, such as Face-
book, LinkedIn, and YouTube.
Social media use by jurors poses many new litigation chal-
lenges and increases the risk of familiar jury concerns, such 
as exposure to news and media accounts of a trial that con-
tain material not admitted into evidence. Juror misconduct 
using social media may have a direct impact on the adminis-
tration, fairness, and integrity of the criminal justice system. 
In modern jury trials, judges, the parties, and their attorneys 
expect that many, if not most, jurors use social media.
Unlike inadmissible or stricken evidence heard by a jury 
during trial, ex parte information a juror obtains online 
cannot be addressed by the court with a curative or limit-
ing instruction to correct any prejudicial effects. (See, e.g., 
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887) (holding that a trial 
should not be suspended where an error in admission of 
testimony can be corrected by its withdrawal with proper 
instruction from the court to disregard it).) Both the state 
and the defense are likewise deprived of the opportunity to 
consider and address the ex parte information by tailoring 
their case strategy or closing statement accordingly. More-
over, complications may arise during jury deliberations 
because the individual jurors will not all be considering 
the same evidence in reaching a verdict. Jurors who con-
duct online research may be tempted to share the results 
of their research with their fellow jurors.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
“the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury 
of  the State.” The Supreme Court held that the failure 
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to provide a defendant with an impartial hearing “vio-
lates even the minimal standards of due process.” (Irvin 
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1961).) The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury has been defined by 
the courts as one “capable and willing to decide the case 
solely on the evidence before it.” (See Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).) Due process and the rules of 
evidence provide that juries may consider only legally 
admissible evidence that is subject to cross-examination 
in open court. (See Ronald D. Spears, Looking for “Facts” 
in All the Wrong Places, 98 ILL. B.J. 102 (2010).) Disposi-
tive evidence may be kept out for various reasons, such 
as the manner in which it was obtained, or because it is 
determined to be unduly prejudicial. It is important that 
jurors do not know what is excluded and why it is excluded.
A growing number of cases address issues arising from 
allegations of improper juror use of social media. Between 
1999 and 2010, 90 verdicts were challenged on the basis of 
Internet-related juror misconduct, according to a Reuters 
Legal study—more than half  within a two-year period. 
Of the 90 challenges, 28 were overturned or had mistrials 
declared. In three-quarters of the cases in which judges 
declined to declare mistrials, Internet-related juror miscon-
duct was present. (See Grow, As Jurors Go Online, supra.)
Jury instructions are a critical component of  efforts 
to prevent juror social media-related misconduct. Pro-
fessor Morrison observes: “The first line of  defense is 
obviously to address the issue in jury instructions.” (Mor-
rison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, supra, at 12; see 
also Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Google, Gadgets, and Guilt: 
Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age, 83 u. CoLo. L. Rev. 
409, 451–52 (2012) (noting that the majority of respon-
dents to the author’s juror survey selected modernized jury 
instructions as the most effective method of preventing 
online research and improper communication by jurors); 
Emily M. Janoski-Haehlen, The Courts Are All a “Twit-
ter”: The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 
46 vaL. u. L. Rev. 43, 61 (2011) (“Adopting pattern jury 
instructions that specifically address the use of  social 
media sites is the most logical place to start.”).)
The purpose of this article is to discuss a sampling of 
cases showing the need for social media jury instructions 
and the range of misconduct in criminal cases that mod-
ern social media jury instructions should address; identify 
criteria based on a review of federal and state social media 
jury instructions that should be useful in evaluating any 
pattern social media jury instruction; and, finally, to pro-
pose model instructions for jurisdictions seeking to adopt 
or improve their social media jury instructions.
Illustrative Cases Involving Jury Misconduct
The following cases illustrate the need for modernizing 
social media jury instructions and the range of juror mis-
conduct that should be addressed. (For additional cases 
in which allegations were made of improper juror use of 
social media, see George L. Blum, Annotation, Preju-
dicial Effect of Juror Misconduct Arising from Internet 
Usage, 48 A.L.R.6th 135 (2009); Eric P. Robinson, Jury 
Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State Survey of 
Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 Reyn-
oLds Cts. & Media L.J. 307 (2011). See generally Eric P 
Robinson, BLog L. onLine, http://bloglawonline.com (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2012) (covering the spectrum of blog and 
Internet law and policy, including up-to-date coverage of 
emerging cases involving juror misconduct).)
Improper use of the Internet to conduct research, investi-
gating facts or the law. Trial safeguards may be significantly 
compromised when jurors conduct online research about 
the case without the knowledge of the court or trial coun-
sel. Conducting Internet research allows a juror to read 
media stories about the crime, find personal information 
about the parties, including criminal history, and even view 
the scene of the crime using Google Maps’ Street View, all 
without leaving the courthouse or home. The vast amount 
of information available increases the likelihood that the 
juror may be influenced by information that is prejudicial, 
unreliable, or inaccurate, or even evidence that has been 
ruled inadmissible. (See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 
2.0, 62 Hastings L.J. 1579, 1584 (2011).)
Despite instructions from the judge not to conduct 
research on the case, a juror in a murder trial looked up 
definitions online for the terms “livor mortis” and “algor 
mortis” and the role it might have had in fixing the time 
of  a beating victim’s death. When asked about it, the 
juror responded, “To me that wasn’t research. It was a 
definition.” The Court of  Special Appeals reversed the 
conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the juror’s 
online search was in direct violation of  the trial court 
judge’s order prohibiting jurors from researching the case. 
(Clark v. State, No. 0953/08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 3, 
2009) (unreported opinion); see also Dennis Sweeney, 
Social Media and Jurors, supra, at 46.)
After repeated explicit instructions not to conduct Inter-
net research, a juror in a capital murder trial researched 
how a person could suffer “retinal detachment,” the injury 
suffered by the victim. In the resulting contempt proceed-
ing for misconduct, the juror’s attorney explained that the 
juror misunderstood the judge’s instruction not to conduct 
research, believing the judge was referring only to facts in 
the case, not related issues such as how a person could suf-
fer certain injuries. (Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges 
for Online Research, ReuteRs LegaL (Jan. 19, 2011), http://
tinyurl.com/9kjhjv2.)
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In a federal case, defendants were charged with ille-
gally operating an Internet pharmacy. After seven weeks 
of trial throughout which the judge gave repeated instruc-
tions not to conduct online research, it was discovered 
during deliberations that nine of the 12 jurors had con-
ducted Internet research about the case during the trial. 
The jurors had Googled news articles, medical terms, the 
lawyers, the defendants, and evidence that had been spe-
cifically excluded by the judge. One juror discovered that 
a defendant had previously been implicated in a related 
criminal matter—evidence the defendant’s attorney had 
specifically moved in limine to exclude (See John Schwartz, 
As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, n.y. 
tiMes, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1.)
Internet research conducted by a juror and shared with 
fellow jury members does not always influence the jury’s 
deliberative process to the extent that a mistrial or reversal 
is warranted. A judge will consider the type of information 
that resulted from the research in making this determi-
nation. For example, where a juror in California told his 
fellow jurors that his online search for “great bodily injury” 
retrieved no information, the court found that the juror’s 
misconduct did not prejudice the defendant. The court 
found no substantial likelihood that the information seen 
by the juror in conducting the search of the term with no 
special legal meaning influenced him in any way detrimen-
tal to the defendant. (See People v. Hamlin, 89 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 402 (Ct. App. 2009).)
Improper use of the Internet to communicate with others. 
Courts admonish jurors not to discuss the case among them-
selves prior to final deliberations to avoid having the jurors 
form opinions before they have heard all of the evidence in 
the case. In addition, jurors are admonished not to commu-
nicate about the case with third parties due to the concern 
that jurors may reach a verdict on the basis of an improper 
communication rather than the evidence admitted at trial.
Despite the apparent clarity of such jury instructions, a 
more specific instruction that addresses social media use is 
needed in order to adequately admonish jurors. Case law 
suggests that many jurors do not understand that acts such 
as tweeting or updating a Facebook status are the type of 
communication or discussion that courts prohibit. For 
many jurors, updating a Facebook status to reflect daily 
thoughts and activities is a matter of habit, and they no 
longer give it much thought. Others may simply determine 
that updating a Facebook status is a one-sided commu-
nication and, therefore, not the type of communication 
addressed by the court. (Hoffmeister, supra, at 433–34; see 
also Paula Hannaford-Agor, Google Mistrials, Twittering 
Jurors, Juror Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, Ct. 
ManageR, Summer 2009, at 42–43 (2009) (stating that for 
some, tweeting and blogging are simply an extension of 
thinking, rather than a form of written communication).)
For example, the day before a verdict was announced in 
a criminal trial in Michigan, a juror posted on her Face-
book page that she was “actually excited for jury duty 
tomorrow. It’s gonna be fun to tell the defendant they’re 
GUILTY.” Defense counsel discovered the Facebook post 
and reported the juror, who was removed prior to the 
start of the second day of the two-day trial. (Hoffmeis-
ter, supra, at 429.)
After sentencing a gang member to prison for mur-
der, a California judge reportedly “ripped into” the jury 
foreman, holding him in contempt for writing a blog that 
exposed the details of the case during trial. Despite daily 
instructions to refrain from discussing the case, the jury 
foreman had been blogging about the case throughout the 
trial and deliberations, posting a photograph of the mur-
der weapon, and running a chat room where people could 
ask him questions about the case. In his testimony at the 
contempt hearing, the foreman said he did not believe his 
blog constituted “discussing the case” in defiance of the 
judge’s instructions. (Raul Hernandez, Juror Held in Con-
tempt for Blog of Murder Trial, ventuRa County staR 
(Jan. 23, 2008), http://tinyurl.com/9twxldd; see also State 
v. Goupil, 908 A.2d 1256 (N.H. 2006).)
At the conclusion of  the evidence in the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial in Dimas-Martinez v. State, 
2011 Ark. 515 (2011) a juror tweeted, “Choices to be made. 
Hearts to be broken. We each define the great line.” (Id., 
slip op. at 12.) When the court questioned the juror, he 
admitted that he had disregarded the court’s instruction 
not to tweet about the case. The court denied the request 
of counsel to remove the juror for his misconduct and the 
fact that one of the juror’s Twitter followers was a reporter. 
(Id.) Thereafter, during jury deliberations in the sentencing 
phase of the trial, the juror tweeted, “If  its [sic] wisdom 
we seek . . . We should run to the strong tower.” (Id., 
slip op. at 14.) An hour before the jury announced that it 
had reached a sentence, the juror tweeted, “Its [sic] over.” 
(Id., slip op. at 15.) The trial court denied the defendant’s 
motion for a new trial, finding that the defendant suffered 
no prejudice. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the 
defendant’s conviction and sentence, finding that the trial 
court’s failure to acknowledge the juror’s inability to follow 
the court’s directions was an abuse of discretion. The court 
recognized that when jurors post musings, thoughts, or 
any other information about trials on any online forums, 
“[t]he possibility for prejudice is simply too high.” (Id., slip 
op. at 16–17.) The court found that “[s]uch a fact is under-
scored in this case . . . because one of the juror’s Twitter 
followers was a reporter.” (Id., slip op. at 17.)
In a civil auto accident case in Texas, a juror pleaded 
guilty to four counts of contempt for trying to “friend” 
the defendant on Facebook and for discussing the case on 
his Facebook page. The misconduct was brought to the 
attention of the trial judge after the defendant notified her 
lawyer of the contact, and her lawyer informed the trial 
judge. The juror was sentenced to two days of commu-
nity service. (See Eva-Marie Ayala, Tarrant County Juror 
Sentenced to Community Service for Trying to “Friend” 
Defendant on Facebook, FoRt WoRtH staR-teLegRaM, 
Aug. 28, 2011.)
Many tweets or e-mails sent during trial may be 
found to be innocuous, such as comments about jury 
duty or lack of refreshments. For example, in the federal 
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corruption trial of former Pennsylvania state senator Vin-
cent Fumo, the district court held that a juror’s Facebook 
posts and tweets, including one stating, “Stay tuned for a 
big announcement on Monday everyone!” did not prej-
udice the defendant. The Third Circuit held that there 
was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding 
that the juror’s statements were innocuous. Far from rais-
ing specific facts about the trial or indicating any bias 
toward the parties, the postings were “so vague as to be 
virtually meaningless” and “nothing more than harmless 
ramblings.” (United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 299, 
305–06 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Michael C. Bromby, Paper 
Presented at the Jury Research Symposium, Institute for 
Advanced Studies, Glasgow: The Temptation to Tweet—
Jurors’ Activities Outside the Trial 2–4 (Mar. 25–26, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590047.)
Distinguishing Harmless from Prejudicial Error
Improper use of social media by jurors, when discovered 
and challenged, may be viewed by the trial and appellate 
courts as harmless rather than prejudicial error. Judges 
have substantial discretion to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether juror misconduct is prejudicial enough to 
a criminal defendant or the state to warrant removing 
the juror from the panel, declaring a mistrial, or, if  on 
appeal, reversing a conviction. When an issue of  mis-
conduct arises, the presiding judge has a duty to fully 
investigate allegations of misconduct to assess the extent 
of any prejudice. (See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 350 
U.S. 377, 379 (1956).)
Courts have assessed the prejudicial impact of juror mis-
conduct involving Internet research by looking at the totality 
of the circumstances, including the type of information that 
resulted from the improper research, the stage of the trial 
when the misconduct occurred, whether the extrinsic evidence 
was communicated to the other jurors, and whether it related 
to a material issue in the case. (See Amanda McGee, Note, 
Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Preva-
lence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 
30 Loy. L.a. ent. L. Rev. 301, 313–14 (2010).)
In drawing the line between prejudicial information 
and harmless error, social psychologists Julie Blackman 
and Ellen Brickman classify the nature of the informa-
tion that jurors might discover online as falling within 
five broad categories: (1) media accounts of  the case; 
(2) virtual physical or other factual evidence; (3) expert 
opinions; (4) personal and professional information on 
the parties involved, including the judge, attorneys, and 
the defendant in criminal cases; and (5) the law (such as 
researching sentences associated with conviction for the 
particular crime charged). (Julie Blackman & Ellen Brick-
man, Let’s Talk: Addressing the Challenges of Internet-Era 
Jurors, JuRy expeRt, Mar. 2011, at 7–8, available at http://
tinyurl.com/3r3gubf.)
While trial judges have considerable discretion to assess 
whether juror misconduct is unduly prejudicial, they are 
required to reasonably exercise this discretion. In State 
v. Gunnell, 973 N.E. 2d 243 (Ohio 2012), the issue before 
the Ohio Supreme Court was whether the trial court acted 
unreasonably in addressing juror misconduct and in deter-
mining that a manifest necessity existed for a mistrial. 
The misconduct involved a juror who conducted Internet 
research on “involuntary manslaughter” and attempted 
to bring the printed material into the jury room during 
deliberations. The trial court questioned the juror about 
the information she had found and why she had looked for 
it, but did not ask her “a single question about the preju-
dice or bias, if  any, created by the improper information or 
her ability to disregard it.” (Id. at 247.) The Ohio Supreme 
Court found that the trial court had not exercised sound 
discretion in determining whether juror bias existed and 
whether it could be cured. The court held that although it 
was error for the juror to conduct outside research, “it was 
also error for the judge to make no more than a limited 
inquiry of the juror—an inquiry that merely established 
the misconduct, not any prejudice from it.” (Id. at 251.)
Internet research consisting of looking up the meaning 
of a word may not be found to be sufficiently prejudicial, 
while research that uncovers an inadmissible prior convic-
tion of the defendant is more likely to result in reversible 
error. Misconduct involving research related to a material 
issue in a case, such as a factual dispute or the credibility of 
a witness or party is also more likely to be found prejudicial.
In Wardlaw v. State, 971 A.2d 331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2009), a juror’s online research led the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals to order a new trial for the defendant accused 
of rape of his 17-year-old daughter. At trial, the defendant’s 
daughter testified that she had sex with the defendant on 
three different occasions and that she had been diagnosed 
with oppositional defiant disorder. A juror conducted online 
research on “oppositional defiant disorder,” and reported to 
the other jurors her finding that lying was associated with 
the disorder. Because the daughter’s credibility was a crucial 
issue, and there was no other evidence to substantiate her 
allegations, the court found that the juror’s research consti-
tuted egregious misconduct and that the trial court’s failure 
to question the jurors about the influence of the individual 
juror’s online research required a reversal.
Other Remedies to Deter Misuse of Social Media
Many courts and legislatures have adopted remedies to 
supplement social media jury instructions. The use of some 
of these remedies may increase the effectiveness of social 
media jury instructions.
A complementary response may include showing a film 
to prospective jurors shortly after they report for jury duty, 
illustrating prohibited uses of social media, explaining why 
using social media is prohibited, and notifying them of the 
penalties that may be imposed. The court’s social media jury 
instructions might be included in this initial presentation.
Attorneys may use voir dire to ask prospective jurors, 
or request the judge inquire, about their social media use 
and whether they would be able to comply with the judge’s 
instructions prohibiting improper social media use. Voir 
dire may provide another opportunity to repeat the court’s 
social media jury instructions and educate jurors at an 
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early stage of the process.
Another suggestion is to require that jurors sign a writ-
ten statement, possibly under oath, acknowledging that 
they have been notified of prohibited social media uses 
and agreeing to abide by the prohibitions, subject to pen-
alties. (See Hoffmeister, supra, at 456–57.)
The threat of sanctions such as fines and contempt may 
be helpful in deterring the kind of misconduct, such as 
Facebook posts and tweets, which is easily detected. Also, 
judges have discretion to confiscate all electronic devices 
during jury deliberations or, in a trial of brief duration, for 
the entire trial. (See Ralph Artigliere et al., Reining in Juror 
Misconduct: Practical Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers, 
FLa. B.J., Jan. 2010, at 8, 12.) Although it is not a widely 
used remedy, a judge may require that jurors be sequestered 
for the duration of the trial or during jury deliberation.
Some of these approaches may discourage citizens from 
serving as jurors. (Hoffmeister, supra, at 436–41; see also 
Dennis M. Sweeney, Md. Circuit Court Judge (Retired), 
Address to the Litigation Section of the Maryland State 
Bar Association: The Internet, Social Media and Jury 
Trials: Lessons Learned from the Dixon Trial (Apr. 29, 
2010) (transcript available at http://juries.typepad.com/
files/judge-sweeney.doc) (“Banning all cell phones, I-Pads 
[sic], and laptops for everyone called in for jury duty is 
unlikely to work and will be viewed as a Luddite solution 
with little support in the jury pool.”).)
Under a California law, jurors who use electronic or 
wireless communication to conduct their own research 
on a case, or talk to outsiders about it, can be sentenced 
to jail time of up to six months for criminal contempt. 
(A.B. 141, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).) The law was 
reportedly prompted by numerous accounts of jurors using 
electronic devices to research or communicate about cases. 
(Eric P. Robinson, New California Law Prohibits Jurors’ 
Social Media Use, Citizen Media L. pRoJeCt (Sept. 1, 
2011), http://tinyurl.com/9rw24jo.)
Other states have adopted different prophylactic measures 
to supplement social media jury instructions. Michigan, for 
example, recently implemented new jury reform rules that 
attempt to reduce the incidence of “Google mistrials” by 
aiming to “alleviate the stress jurors feel about not being 
able to talk about the case.” (See Lindsay M. Sestile, Michi-
gan Adopts New Jury-Reform Rules, Litig. neWs, Sept. 28, 
2011.) The new jury reform rules include permitting jurors 
to submit questions to witnesses through the judge and to 
take their notes into the jury room for use during delibera-
tions. (MiCH. adMin. Code r. 2.513 (2011).)
Remedies that allow jurors to take on a more active role 
Voir dire may provide another opportunity to repeat  
the court’s social media jury instructions and educate 
jurors at an early stage of the process.
may lessen the likelihood that jurors will feel the need to 
seek additional information on the Internet. (See Morri-
son, Jury 2.0, supra, at 1625–31 (supporting a more active 
role for the jury on the ground that allowing them to ask 
questions will reduce the urge to seek information online).)
Four Criteria for Modernizing Jury Instructions
Among the most practical and cost-effective solutions for 
accommodating social media in the courtroom is to adopt 
explicit and explanatory jury instructions that address 
improper social media use.
Of the 47 states and the District of  Columbia that 
have compiled criminal jury instructions, 11 have yet 
to formally adopt modern instructions that address the 
Internet or social media. Thirty-six states and four federal 
circuits have adopted pattern criminal jury instructions 
that address social media use with varying degrees of 
specificity. Several of  these states contain only blanket 
admonitions not to use social media to research or com-
municate about the case. (See Robinson, Jury Instructions 
for the Modern Age, supra.)
Based on a review of the criminal pattern jury instruc-
tions on improper social media use that have been adopted 
by states and federal circuits and our review of applicable 
case law, we have identified four criteria that jurisdictions 
should consider in adopting or revising modern social 
media jury instructions.
1. Use plain language and social media terminology. 
Jury instructions should use plain language and com-
mon social media terminology that accurately describe 
the prohibited social media conduct, such as “texting,” 
“e-mailing,” “tweeting,” or “posting.” The cases discussed 
above illustrate that many jurors do not understand that 
prohibited “communications” or “discussions” include 
a blog entry or a Facebook update and that prohibited 
“research” means that jurors cannot use a dictionary or a 
Google search to obtain the definition of  a word they do 
not understand. Jury instructions need to clearly describe 
the types of  information that may not be shared, such 
as “facts,” “impressions,” “opinions,” “thoughts,” and 
“reactions” about the case, any place discussed in the tes-
timony, or any of the individuals participating in the trial, 
including the parties, witnesses, attorneys, court person-
nel, and the judge. Using social media terminology in a 
way that indicates an understanding of  social media use 
puts the admonition in context for jurors, encouraging 
attentive listening and improving juror comprehension.
Hawaii’s standard criminal jury instruction, amended 
in 2009 by the Hawaii Supreme Court to address juror 
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use of social media, uses effective social media terminol-
ogy in admonishing jurors not to communicate about the 
case, stating, “No discussion also means no e-mailing, text 
messaging, tweeting, [or] blogging. . . .” (HaW. CRiMinaL 
JuRy instRuCtions 2.01 (rev. 2009); see also Jana Lauren 
Harris, Social Media in the Jury Room Can Sabotage Tri-
als, FindLaW KnoWLedge-Base, July 28, 2009 (“[D]o not 
‘Google’ any party . . . ‘blog’ about the case or . . . ‘tweet’ 
about anything. . . .”).)
2. Give specific examples of prohibited social media 
conduct. Providing specific examples of prohibited social 
media reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation by indi-
vidual jurors. (See Tricia R. DeLeon & Janelle S. Forteza, 
Is Your Jury Panel Googling during the Trial?, 52 AdvoC. 
36, 38 (2010) (quoting statements made by Texas judges 
suggesting that jurors do not think of their Internet activi-
ties as violating their jury instructions).) Instructions are 
most effective when only a few selective examples are pro-
vided to jurors along with the rationale for the restrictions, 
rather than an admonition consisting of  a long list of 
examples of prohibited social media conduct. By provid-
ing specific examples of prohibited social media use, such 
as using Wikipedia or Googling to look up the definition 
of  a word or obtain other information about the case, 
there is less ambiguity.
It is often not the means of conducting research that the 
juror misunderstood, but the term “research” itself. (See 
Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, supra 
(discussing a mistrial in Pennsylvania caused by a juror 
who conducted online research about the injuries suffered 
by the victim and later explained that she misunderstood 
the judge’s instruction not to conduct research, believing 
the judge was referring only to facts in the case, not related 
issues such as how a person could suffer certain injuries).)
A proposed instruction by retired Maryland Circuit 
Court Judge Dennis Sweeney addresses this issue by 
instructing jurors not to conduct research and then defin-
ing what constitutes research: “I mean ‘research’ in the 
broadest possible meaning of the word. That is, you can-
not use a public library, a dictionary, or a simple Google 
search to clarify or obtain, for example, even something 
as simple as the definition of a word you do not under-
stand.” (Dennis M. Sweeney, Worlds Collide: The Digital 
Native Enters the Jury Box, 1 ReynoLds Cts. & Media 
L.J. 121 (2011).)
A predominant use of  social media sites is to “post” 
or “publish” information that may be directed to no one 
in particular, yet viewable to everyone, using popular fea-
tures like a tweet, a Facebook status, or a blog post. Given 
its widespread popularity, this particular use of  social 
media should be specifically addressed in jury instruc-
tions to resolve any misconceptions jurors may entertain 
regarding their duty not to communicate about the case. 
As opposed to “communicating” or “discussing” informa-
tion, which usually implies a two-sided interaction, this 
particular use of social media is more accurately described 
by using different terminology, such as “posting” or “pub-
lishing” information.
The ongoing emergence of new technology will likely 
require periodic revisions to keep jury instructions updated 
with current examples of social media misconduct. New 
Mexico’s social media jury instructions include a blank 
space meant to be filled in by the judge with up-to-date 
illustrations. (n.M. uniFoRM JuRy instRuCtions CRiMinaL 
14-101 (2011).) This type of provision provides built-in 
flexibility and ensures that the instruction will be adapt-
able and well-tailored to new technology and social media.
3. Explain the rationale for social media restrictions. 
Jurors who are provided with the rationale underlying 
social media restrictions are less likely to arrive at the 
mistaken conclusion that they have not run afoul of 
the court’s admonitions. Also, jurors are more likely to 
understand that compliance with the restrictions helps 
ensure that the parties receive a fair trial. Jurors need 
to be informed, for example, that tweeting case-spe-
cific information is prohibited because it divulges that 
information to outsiders and may be viewable by a wit-
ness excluded from proceedings prior to testimony. In 
addition, social media use can take many forms, and pro-
viding jurors with the rationale for the restrictions will 
equip them with the means to evaluate their own social 
media conduct and determine whether it falls within the 
court’s admonition. Finally, jurors will be better able to 
see the restrictions as meaningful and important, rather 
than a boilerplate limitation on their conduct. For a 
good example of  a thorough rationale for social media 
restrictions, see Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions (Criminal Cases) 1 (2010) (preliminary instruction).
Our review of criminal pattern jury instructions on 
improper social media use that have been adopted by fed-
eral circuits and the states leads us to conclude that the most 
prevalent and serious deficiency is an inadequate explana-
tion of the rationale for social media prohibitions. Professor 
Morrison states: “Probably the most helpful way to give 
instructions is to explain to jurors why they should not surf, 
blog, or tweet during trial. If this instruction comes across 
as nothing more than another admonition, jurors may well 
shrug it off.” (Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, 
supra, at 12–13.) Professor Hoffmeister adds:
Providing the “why” is important because jurors 
in the Digital Age are more receptive to learning 
information online. Moreover, many jurors today 
feel comfortable using technology to discover facts 
for themselves or communicate with others. As a 
result, it is a challenge to get these jurors to give up 
their methods of learning and acquiring information 
and adhere to the court’s instructions.
(Hoffmeister, supra, at 453–54 (footnotes omitted).)
4. Describe the consequences of violating social media 
restrictions. To further impress upon jurors the impor-
tance of the social media restrictions, courts should inform 
jurors of the consequences of failing to adhere to them, 
such as mistrials, resulting in a substantial waste of time 
and resources, and disciplinary sanctions for jurors who 
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violate the court’s instructions. Hoffmeister suggests the 
following language:
If you communicate with anyone about the case or 
do outside research during the trial, it could lead to 
a mistrial, which is a tremendous expense and incon-
venience to the parties, the court, and, ultimately, you 
as taxpayers. Furthermore, you could be held in con-
tempt of court and subject to punishment such as 
paying the costs associated with having a new trial.
(Id. at 467.)
Application of Criteria to Illustrative Modern 
Social Media Jury Instructions
The following are excerpts from selected jury instruc-
tions that address the two categories of social media use 
in which most instances of juror misconduct occur: the use 
of social media to conduct case-related research and the 
use of social media to communicate or post/publish infor-
mation about a case. In addition, the following instructions 
also contain one or more of the four criteria for effective 
social media jury instructions discussed above.
US Judicial Conference. On August 21, 2012, the US 
Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration 
and Case Management approved a model jury instruction 
to help deter jurors from using social media to research 
or communicate about cases on which they serve. The 
instruction is an updated version of a prior social media 
instruction adopted in January 2010.The following is an 
excerpt from the updated 2012 instruction:
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on 
the evidence presented here within the four walls of 
this courtroom. This means that during the trial you 
must not conduct any independent research about 
this case, the matters in the case, and the individu-
als or corporations involved in the case. In other 
words, you should not consult dictionaries or refer-
ence materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or 
use any other electronic tools to obtain information 
about this case or to help you decide the case. Please 
do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom.
. . . .
I know that many of  you use cell phones, Black-
berries, the internet and other tools of  technology. 
You also must not talk to anyone at any time about 
this case or use these tools to communicate elec-
tronically with anyone about the case. This includes 
your family and friends. You may not communi-
cate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, 
through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, 
or on Twitter, through any blog or website, includ-
ing Facebook, Google+, My Space, LinkedIn, or 
YouTube. You may not use any similar technology 
of  social media, even if  I have not specifically men-
tioned it here. I expect you will inform me as soon 
as you become aware of  another juror’s violation 
of  these instructions.
(U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Court Admin. & 
Case Mgmt., Proposed Model Jury Instruction on the 
Use of Electronic Technology to Conduct Research on 
or Communicate about a Case (June 2012).)
Minnesota. Recognizing the need to use plain language 
jury instructions, Minnesota’s criminal jury instructions 
provide two versions of its preliminary criminal instruc-
tion, an original version and a more simplified plain 
language version. A note to judges in the instructions 
explains, “Each judge will probably find jurors respond 
best to a statement about the process and the case that is 
phrased as naturally as possible by the judge.” (10 Min-
nesota pRaCtiCe, JuRy instRuCtion guides—CRiMinaL 
(CRiMJig) ch. 1, n.1 (5th ed. 2010).) The following is 
an excerpt from the plain language version:
When you go home during the trial, do not talk to 
your family, friends, or others about the case. You 
may tell them you are a juror on a criminal case and 
that is all that you should tell them. Do not report 
your experiences as a juror while the trial and delib-
erations are going on. Do not e-mail, blog, tweet, 
text or post anything to your Facebook, MySpace, 
or other social networking sites about this trial. Do 
not visit any “chat rooms” where this case may be 
discussed.
Do not read or listen to news reports about the case.
Do not do your own investigation. Do not ask peo-
ple about this case. Do not visit any of the locations 
mentioned in the trial. Do not research anything 
about the case, including the issues, evidence, parties, 
witnesses, location, or the law, through any form of 
written, print, electronic or Internet media.
. . . .
If  you do not follow these instructions, you may 
jeopardize the trial. This may require the whole trial 
to be redone and we will have to start over.
(Id. at CRIMJIG 2.08.)
Idaho. Instructions in this article are based, in part, on 
Idaho’s criminal jury instruction on juror conduct. Idaho’s 
instruction improves juror comprehension by addressing 
social media restrictions as they apply to specific popu-
lar uses of social media, such as looking up information 
online as a matter of routine. The instruction also accom-
plishes this by addressing social media using the popular 
terminology, such as “Googling,” the most common way 
of  referring to looking something up on the Internet. 
Instructions not to “Google” anything makes it instantly 
clear to jurors the type of conduct that is prohibited.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for 
information on-line and to “Google” something as 
a matter of  routine. Also, in a trial it can be very 
tempting for jurors to do their own research to make 
sure they are making the correct decision. You must 
resist that temptation for our system of justice to 
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work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must 
decide the case only on the evidence received here in 
court. If  you communicate with anyone about the 
case or do outside research during the trial it could 
cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors 
and you could be held in contempt of court.
(idaHo CRiMinaL JuRy instRuCtions 108 (2010).)
Utah. The “model” jury instruction we propose below is 
based, in part, on Utah’s criminal jury instruction, which 
contains elements of all the criteria suggested for effec-
tive social media instructions. Utah’s instruction is also 
unique in that it references the growing number of trials 
that have been disrupted by jurors who have failed to abide 
by social media restrictions. The reference to real events 
may be more effective in commanding the interest and 
attention of the jury because it lessens the impression of 
being a boilerplate admonition. Also, Utah’s instruction 
is unusual because it attempts to cast doubt in the minds 
of jurors that they can avoid the consequences of violat-
ing the court’s instructions by doing so surreptitiously, or 
by evading detection until after the conclusion of the trial.
Jurors have caused serious problems during trials by using 
computer and electronic communication technology. You 
may be tempted to use these devices to investigate the 
case, or to share your thoughts about the trial with oth-
ers. However, you must not use any of these electronic 
devices while you are serving as a juror.
You violate your oath as a juror if you conduct your own 
investigations or communicate about this trial with others, 
and you may face serious consequences if you do. Let me 
be clear: do not “Google” the parties, witnesses, issues, or 
counsel; do not “Tweet” or text about the trial. . . .
Please understand that the rules of evidence and 
procedure have developed over hundreds of years in 
order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The 
fairness of the entire system depends on you reaching 
your decisions based on evidence presented to you 
in court, and not on other sources of information.
Post-trial investigations are common and can dis-
close these improper activities. If  they are discovered, 
they will be brought to my attention and the entire 
case might have to be retried, at substantial cost.
(ModeL utaH JuRy instRuCtions, CRiMinaL 109B (2d ed. 
2010) (recess admonition).)
Proposed “Model” Social Media Jury Instructions
Needless to say, there is no “perfect” social media instruc-
tion, and some jurors will disregard any social media 
jury instruction. The effectiveness of an instruction will 
depend, in part, on such factors as the delivery of  the 
instructions, their repetition at various points throughout 
the trial, and the use of complementary remedies to deter 
social media misconduct.
The proposed social media jury instructions, below, 
are based on jury instructions published in the 2011 
Supplement to Maryland Criminal Jury Instructions and 
Commentary. They include two versions of the instruction: 
an “amplified instruction” to be given at the beginning and 
conclusion of the trial and an “abbreviated instruction” to 
be given, as appropriate, before a recess and before jurors 
leave for home at the end of a trial day.
Social Media cautioning: Beginning and  
end of trial (aMplified inStruction)
There are rules that each of you must follow in order 
to have a fair trial in this case. If you fail to follow 
these rules, you violate your oath as a juror and may 
face serious consequences. You must not be exposed to 
any information other than the evidence presented in 
this courtroom. This includes any information about 
issues or people involved in this trial. I now want to 
give you a detailed explanation about what you should 
and should not do during your time as jurors.
First, do not communicate to anyone any infor-
mation about this case, or disclose your thoughts 
about this case or the individuals participating in 
it. This includes, but is not limited to, discussing the 
evidence, the lawyers, the court, or your thoughts, 
opinions, and reactions about any aspect of the case. 
In addition to not talking face to face with anyone, 
you must not share information with anyone about 
the case by any other means, for example, by texting, 
emailing, tweeting, or posting on social-networking 
sites such as Facebook. This includes not communi-
cating with your fellow jurors until I give you the case 
for deliberation. It also applies to communicating 
with everyone else, including your family members 
and your employer, although you may notify your 
family and your employer that you have been seated 
as a juror in the case.
Second, you must not conduct your own research 
or investigation about the case or try to get informa-
tion from any source other than what you see and 
hear in the courtroom. I use the word “research” 
in the broadest possible meaning of the word. This 
means, for example, you cannot use a dictionary or a 
Google search to obtain even something as simple as 
the definition of a word you do not understand. You 
must not consult any news sources, reference materi-
als, or “Google” any information about the case, the 
law that applies to the case, or the people involved, 
including the defendant, the witnesses, the lawyers, 
or myself. You must not do any personal investiga-
tion, including visiting any of the places related to 
this case or viewing them on the Internet, for exam-
ple, using Google Maps. This applies whether you 
are in the courthouse, at home, or anywhere else.
In summary, you may not use any social media 
technology to conduct your own investigation or 
communicate about matters related to this case. Let 
me be clear: do not “Google” the parties, witnesses, 
issues, or counsel; do not “tweet” or text about the 
trial; do not text or email information about the case; 
do not post updates about the trial on Facebook; do 
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not use Google Maps or other Internet sources. Even 
using something as seemingly innocent as “Wikipe-
dia” to obtain information related to this case can 
result in serious consequences.
It is important that you understand why these 
rules exist and why they are so important:
Only you have been qualified to be jurors in this case 
and only you have taken an oath to be fair and impartial.
The law does not permit you to talk among 
yourselves about the case until I tell you to begin 
deliberations because early discussions can lead to 
a premature final decision.
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for 
information online and to “Google” something as 
a matter of  routine. Also, in a trial it can be very 
tempting for jurors to do their own research to make 
sure they are making the correct decision, but you 
must resist the temptation to seek outside infor-
mation. Looking for outside information is unfair 
because the parties do not have the opportunity to 
refute, explain or correct what you have discovered. 
The trial process works by each side knowing exactly 
what evidence is being considered by you and what 
law you are applying to the facts you find.
For this reason, you are not permitted to visit a 
place discussed in the testimony. First, you cannot 
always be sure that the place is in the same condition 
as it was on the day in question. Second, even if  it 
were in the same condition, once you go to a place 
discussed in the testimony to evaluate the evidence 
in light of what you see, you become a witness, not 
a juror. As a witness, you may now have a mistaken 
view of the scene that may not be subject to correc-
tion by either party.
Finally, you must not read or listen to any news 
accounts of the case, and you must not do research on 
any fact, issue, or law related to the case. For instance, 
the law often uses words and phrases in special ways, 
so it’s important that any definitions you hear come 
only from me, and not from any other source. Your 
decision must be based solely on the testimony and 
other evidence presented in this courtroom. It would 
not be fair to the parties for you to base your decision 
on some reporter’s view or opinion, or upon informa-
tion you acquire outside the courtroom which may be 
incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate.
These rules are designed to help guarantee a fair 
trial. The fairness of the entire system depends on 
your reaching your verdict based solely on the evi-
dence presented to you in court. If  you violate these 
rules, you jeopardize the fairness of these proceed-
ings and could be held in contempt of court. Also, 
a mistrial could result that would require the entire 
trial process to start over. As you can imagine, a mis-
trial is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to 
the parties, the court, and the taxpayers. [Post-trial 
investigations are common and can disclose these 
improper activities. If  they are discovered, they will 
be brought to my attention and the entire case might 
have to be retried.]
I trust that you understand and appreciate the 
importance of following these rules and, based on 
your oath and promise, I know you will do so.
[If any of you have any difficulty whatsoever in fol-
lowing these instructions, please notify the bailiff or 
the clerk, who will notify me. If any of you become 
aware that one of your fellow jurors has done some-
thing that violates these instructions, you are obligated 
to report that as well. If a headline or announcement 
catches your attention, do not read or listen further. 
If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either 
directly or indirectly, or sends you any information 
about the case, please report this promptly as well.]
(david e. aaRonson, MaRyLand CRiMinaL JuRy instRuC-
tions and CoMMentaRy § 1.06(E) (3d ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011).
Social Media cautioning:  
during trial (aBBreviated inStruction)
Let me remind you once again that you must decide 
this case based only on the evidence introduced at 
trial. You must not communicate or share any infor-
mation with anyone about this case, or disclose your 
thoughts about it or the individuals participating in 
it. This includes, but is not limited to, discussing the 
evidence, the lawyers, the court, or your thoughts, 
opinions, and reactions about any aspect of the case. 
In addition to not talking face to face with anyone 
about the case, you must not communicate informa-
tion about the case by any means, including texting, 
emailing, tweeting, or posting on social-networking 
sites like Facebook. You also must not read or lis-
ten to any news accounts of the case. Finally, you 
must not conduct your own research or investiga-
tion about the case or try to get information from 
any source other than what you see and hear in the 
courtroom. This means, for example, you cannot 
use a dictionary or a Google search to obtain even 
something as simple as the definition of a word you 
do not understand.
In summary, do not “Google” the parties, wit-
nesses, issues, or counsel; do not “tweet” or text 
about the trial; do not text or email information 
on the case; do not post updates about the trial on 
Facebook; do not use Google Maps or other Internet 
sources. Even using something as seemingly innocent 
as “Wikipedia” to obtain information related to this 
case can result in serious consequences.
[If any of you have any difficulty whatsoever in fol-
lowing these instructions, please notify the bailiff or 
the clerk, who will notify me. If any of you become 
aware that one of your fellow jurors has done some-
thing that violates these instructions, you are obligated 
to report that as well. If a headline or announcement 
catches your attention, do not read or listen further. 
If anyone tries to contact you about the case, either 
directly or indirectly, or sends you any information 
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about the case, please report this promptly as well.]
(Id. § 1.06(G).)
Conclusion
An increasing number of cases address issues arising from 
allegations of  juror misconduct using social media. At 
least 36 states and four federal circuits have adopted jury 
instructions that seek to deter juror misuse of social media 
with varying degrees of  specificity and effectiveness, as 
reflected in the case law. A review of these jury instructions 
suggests that effective social media instructions should 
meet four criteria: (1) use plain language and social media 
terminology; (2) give specific examples of prohibited social 
media conduct; (3) explain the rationale for social media 
restrictions; and (4) describe the consequences of violating 
social media restrictions. The most common and serious 
deficiency is an inadequate explanation of the rationale 
for social media restrictions.
We propose two “model” jury instructions—an ampli-
fied and an abbreviated version—that should reduce juror 
misunderstanding and confusion, enable jurors to better 
understand the restrictions as meaningful and important, 
and direct juror attention to the serious consequences of 
violating the court’s instructions. n
